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FEDERAL COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE




The federal rules,' as well as the statutes of Nebraska 2 and
the codes of civil procedure of three-fourths of the other juris-
dictions,3 require that an action be brought by, or in the name
of, the real party in interest. In short, this requires that the
action be prosecuted in the name of the party who, by the sub-
* B.S., 1956; LL.B., 1959, University of Nebraska; member Nebraska
Bar Association and American Bar Association; Teaching-Research
Associate, College of Law, University of Nebraska, 1959-60; presently
associated with Crosby, Pansing, Guenzel and Binning, Lincoln,
Nebraska.
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a), 28 U.S.C.A. Every action shall be prosecuted
in the name of the Teal party in interest; but an executor, administra-
tor, guardian, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in
whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another,
or a party authorized by statute may sue in his own name without
joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought;
and when a statute of the United States so provides, an action for
the use or benefit of another shal be brought in the name of the
United States.
2 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-301 (Reissue 1956). Every action must be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as other-
wise provided in Section 25-304.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-304 (Reissue 1956) An executor, administra-
tor, guardian, trustee of an express trust, a person with whom or in
whose name a contract is made for the benefit of another, or a
person expressly authorized by statute, may bring an action without
joining with him the person for whose benefit it is prosecuted. Of-
ficers may sue and be sued in such name as is authorized by law,
and official bonds may be sued upon in the same way, and assignees
of choses in action assigned for the purpose of collection, may sue
on any claim assigned in writing, but such assignee shall be re-
quired to furnish security for costs as in case of nonresident plaintiffs.
3 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 1306, n.5 (2d ed. 1953).
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stantive law, has the right which is sought to be enforced. This
is qualified to some degree by the permissive exceptions in-
cluded in rule; for example, a person authorized by statute may
sue in his own name, whether or not he is the real party in in-
terest as defined above. Some of the stated exceptions are un-
necessary if the definition is correctly applied. For instance, the
rule allows the trustee to sue without joining the beneficiary. This
is unnecessary, because the substantive law of trusts allows the
trustee to prosecute the action in most instances, and the ex-
ception adds nothing.
The first codification of the real party in interest rule was
in the Field Code of New York in 1848. One of the reasons for
the inclusion of such a rule was to aid in the blending of law and
equity jurisdictions. Prior to this, equity permitted a suit by an
assignee to sue in the name of his assignor. Thus the adoption
of the rule was an acceptance of the equity doctrine that he who
has the right is the person to pursue the remedy. Some writers
feel that the real party in interest rule was not needed to ac-
complish the combination of law and equity courts. They argue
that all that was required was a rule abolishing the use of a nom-
inal plaintiff as had been permitted in law courts.4
Another reason expressed in favor of the rule is that it pro-
tects the defendant from being subjected to more than one suit
in cases of partial assignment. The feeling is that since there is
a single claim or substantive right, the fact that part of it has
been assigned should not require the defendant to defend two
suits, because there still remains only one cause of action for a
single wrong or debt, but it is now owned by two or more persons.
The real party in interest rule is allowed to be used by the de-
fendant to require the assignor and assignee in cases of partial
assignment to sue in the same action, thereby preventing the
splitting of the cause of action. On its face, the real party in
interest rule does not appear to have any connection with such
an application. In fact it could be said to lead to a contrary
conclusion. After a partial assignment, both the assignor and as-
signee have substantive rights, and the rule requires each of
them to enforce his own right. Certainly the defendant could
not object that the assignee is not a real party in interest for the
amount of the assignment.
If the result obtained by this application of the real party
in interest rule is a desirable one, it could be obtained through
4 Thomas E. Atkinson, The Real Party In Interest Rule: A Plea For Its
Abolition, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 926, 959 (1957):
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the use of the doctrine of res judicata. The United States Supreme
Court in Commissioner v. Sunnen,5 in speaking about res judicata
stated:
The general rule of res judicata applies to repetitious suits
involving the same cause of action. It rests upon considerations
of economy of judicial time and public policy favoring the estab-
lishment of certainty in legal relations. The rule provides that
when a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judg-
ment on the merits of a cause of action, the parties to the suit
and their privies are thereafter bound, 'not only as to every
matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the
claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which
might have been offered for that purpose.' Cromwell v. County
of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352. The judgment put an end to the cause
of action, which cannot again be brought into litigation between
the parties upon any ground whatever, absent fraud or some
other factor, invalidating the judgment. See Von Moschzisker,
'Res Judicata,' 38 Yale L.J. 299; Restatement of the Law of Judg-
ments, §§ 47, 48.
If a partial assignee is treated as a privy of the assignor, each
owning a portion of a single cause of action, an interpretation of
this rule could be said to force the assignee to join with the as-
signor and sue for the whole dollar amount of the claim on which
the cause of action is based or he will be forever barred. This
reaches the same result as the application of the real party in
interest rule above discussed, and is more sensible in light of the
two rules. The same result could be reached through the adop-
tion of joinder of parties statutes or rules.
Subrogation is quite similar to assignment. Most instances of
subrogation occur where an insurer pays part or all of a loss
suffered by one of its insureds, and then, by operation of law, the
insurer becomes subrogated to part of the claim against the
wrongdoer. Perhaps because subrogation, and the ensuing split-
ting of the substantive right, occurs by operation of law, and is
not voluntary as are assignments, some distinction should be
made. But most of the time the insurer takes a written assign-
ment from the insured also. Thus it can be said within the terms
of the statute that the insurer is a real party in interest and must
prosecute the action against the wrongdoer in its own name,
or jointly with the insured.
There is a general feeling that when an insurance company
is a party to litigation, either as plaintiff or defendant, the jury
will frequently be prejudiced against it. Many courts take great
pains to prevent the element of insurance from being improperly
5 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1947).
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injected into the proceedings. In Nebraska, for example, the im-
proper mentioning of insurance is grounds for a mis-trial.6 Even
though the real party in interest rule would appear to require the
insurer to participate in the prosecution of the action for the
amount of the claim acquired by subrogation, many courts do
not so require.
• . . [I]t is generally held that if the insurance paid by the
insurer covers only a portion of the loss, the insurer is not the
real party in interest, but rather, the right of action against the
wrongdoer who caused the loss remains in the insured for the
entire loss, and the action must be brought by him in his own
name.7
Why do some courts create this apparent exception to the
real party in interest rule? Some say to prevent the splitting
of the cause of action, but which is the greater evil, violat-
a cause of action; probably the latter. But neither need be vio-
lated, if the wrongdoer is allowed to force the insurer to become
a party, which will be seen is the rule of the federal courts. Other
courts say the insured can sue alone because he is a trustee for
the part of the claim subrogated to the insurer, but this is mere-
ly a fiction, possibly created to avoid the application of prejudice
against the insurance company.
The federal courts have construed their real party in interest
rule, Rule 17(a), in such a manner that in many instances an
insurance company can be forced to be, or must be, a party to
the litigation. Such cases are most prominent in the areas of
collision and fire losses, and workmen's compensation cases. Thus
if prejudices do exist, and are applied against insurance com-
panies, the circumstance created is not a good one for a fair
and impartial adjudication of the claim. It must be remembered
that insurance companies are not babes in the woods, and if the
subrogation causes them to prosecute the action against the wrong-
doer in their own name, they can and have developed methods
of payment to counter this, and thereby attempt to evade any
prejudices that might be applied against them by the jury.
II. COMPLETE PAYMENT BY THE INSURER
Example A
P's $20,000 store building was totally destroyed by fire.
Allegedly due to the negligence of the D Power Co. in the
operation and maintenance of its electric power lines into
6 Fielding v. Publix Cars, Inc., 130 Neb. 576, 265 N. W. 726 (1936).
7 29A Am. Jur. Insurance § 1746 (1960).
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the building. P's fire insurer, the XYZ Ins. Co., paid P
$20,000, the full amount of the loss.
Assuming diversity of citizenship for federal court jurisdic-
tion, the real party in interest under Federal Rule 17 (a) to litigate
with the D Power Co. its alleged liability for the destruction of
P's Store is the XYZ Ins. Co.
There appears to be no dispute among the federal courts that if
the substantive law is such that an insurer is subrogated to the
rights of the insured upon payment of a loss, and the insurer-
subrogee has paid the entire loss suffered by the insured, the
insurer is the only real party in interest and must sue in its own
name. This was an unequivocal holding of the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Com-
pany.8 This rule has never been questioned by any subsequent
case. The bulk of the cases expounding this rule, aside from two
of the cases involved in the Aetna appeal,9 have been in the
Tenth Circuit.'10
Even though it is clear from these decisions that the insurer
is the only real party in interest and the suit to recover from the
wrongdoer must be maintained in the name of the insurer, the
defendant in the case of Kansas Electric Power v. Janis' was
denied a motion to dismiss where an action was brought within
the time allowed by the statute of limitations by the insured, who
had been fully paid by the insurer, in his own name for the
benefit of the insurer. Defendant objected to this complaint,
whereupon the insurer as plaintiff, filed a new complaint after
the statute of limitation period had expired. Defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss was based on the ground that action was barred
by the statute of limitations. The court, in denying the motion,
stated that since the complaint was not changed in substance
after the limitation period had expired, and the in-time com-
plaint showed that the action was for the benefit of the insurer,
the new complaint did not affect in any way the rights of the de-
fendant, the cause of action being precisely the same.
8 338 U.S. 366 (1940).
9 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. U.S., 170 F. 2d 469 (2d Cir. 1948);
United States v. Yorkshire Ins. Co., 171 F. 2d 374 (3d Cir. 1948).
10 American Fidelity & Casualty Co., Inc. v. All American Bus Lines,
179 F. 2d 7 (10th Cir. 1949), Gas Service Co. v. Hunt, 183 F. 2d 417(10th Cir. 1950), Kansas Electric Power Co. v. Janis, 194 F. 2d 942(10th Cir. 1952). See also Continental Bus System, Inc. v. Rohwer,
172 F. Supp. 487 (D. Colo. 1959).
-1 Supra, note 10.
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In Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tel-Mor Garage Corp. 12 the
insurer had paid three of its insureds the full amount of their
losses, none over $2,000, and then combined the three claims in a
single suit for $4,300 against the defendant who was allegedly
liable for the losses. Defendant moved to dismiss, alleging that
the claims in fact belonged to the insured, who lacked diversity
and none had the necessary dollar amount for the court's jurisdic-
tion.13 In denying the motion the court held that Rule 18 (a)14
allowed combining of claims by the plaintiff to acquire the neces-
sary dollar amount for jurisdiction, and went on to say that under
the rule of the Aetna case, the insurer-subrogee who had paid the
full amount of the insured's loss is the only real party in interest
and must bring the suit in its own name.
There is no problem in the application of the real party in
interest rule in cases like these where the insurer has paid the
total amount of the loss. There should be no question that the
insurer has all of the substantive right and must prosecute the
action the insured, after being paid in full, has no interest in
the claim and should in no way be connected with the prosecution
of the action. There is no problem of splitting the cause of ac-
tion, because there remains a single right of action wholly owned
by one litigant. Thus the application of the real party in in-
terest rule creates no problems, except the fact that prejudices
might be applied against the insurer as plaintiff.
III. PARTIAL PAYMENT BY TEE INSURER
Example B
P's semi-truck was involved in a collision with a bus be-
longing to the D Bus Co. The truck was damaged to the
to the extent of $12,000. P's collision insurer, the XYZ Ins. Co.
paid P $11,000 under the terms of the policy. Now the XYZ
Ins. Co. is only a partial subrogee, with P still retaining part
of the substantive right against the D Bus Co.
The real party in interest problem in this situation was well
stated by the court in the Aetna case, "In the case of a partial
subrogee the question arises whether suit may be brought by
the insurer alone, whether suit must be brought in the name of
12 92 F. Supp. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
'3 At the time of this litigation, the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332
(1949), required the amount in controversy in diversity cases to
exceed $3,000.
14 FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a), 28 U.S.C.A.
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the insured for his own use and for the use of the insurance
company, or whether all parties in interest must join in the
action."'u  Common law would have required the insured to bring
this action in his own name for the use of the insurer.16 But the
Supreme Court in Aetna said that since the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a reason no longer appears why
such a practice should be required in cases of partial subrogation,
since both the insured and the insurer "own!" portions of the
substantive right against the wrongdoer, they should appear in
the litigation in their own names.
The Eighth Circuit said in National Garment Co. v. N.Y.C. &
St. L. R. Co.:'7
The rule is that in absence of timely objection on the part
of the defendant, the party suffering the loss [the insured] may
maintain an action for recovery of the whole loss against the
party primary liable, although the plaintiff has been indemni-
fied for part of his loss, and the indemnifier, to the extent of the
payment made, has been subrogated to the plaintiff's rights
against the person primary liable.
In this situation there are two real parties in interest, the in-
surer to the extent of its payment to the insurer, and the insured to
the extent of the difference between the payment received from the
insurer and the whole loss. "In the absence of objection, either may
maintain an action against the person primarily liable, the insurer
to the extent of its payment, and the insured to the extent of the
whole loss. The rule against splitting a cause of action is for the
benefit of the defendant and may be waived."' 8 (Emphasis sup-
plied.) Apparently the insured is allowed to sue for the amount of
the whole loss, in absence of objection from the defendant, on the
theory that he does so for the benefit of the insurer for the
amount it has paid, and the recovery is impressed with a trust
for the insurer for the amount it has paid.
To enable the defendant to know if part of the claim has
been subrogated, so that he can make a timely motion to bring
in other real parties in interest, the Supreme Court in the Aetna
case laid down the following rule, "The pleadings should be
made to reveal and assert the actual interest of the plaintiff and
15 Supra, note 8, at 381.
18 Hall & Long v. Railroad Companies, 13 Wall. 368 (1872); Glenn v.
Marbury, 145 U.S. 499 (1892).
17 173 F. 2d 32, 34 (8th Cir. 1949).
18 Id. at 34. See also: United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
supra, note 8; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Peoples National Gas
Co., 166 F. Supp. 11 (W.D. Penn. 1958).
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to indicate the interests of any others in the claim."' 9 Most cases20
agree that upon the motion of the defendant, the absent real
party in interest should be made a party plaintiff, having both
the insured and insurer appear in the litigation in their own
names.
Judge Donovan of the District of IMinnesota, in the case of
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Falkinghamn2 refused to make the sub-
rogated insurers parties plaintiff on the motion of the defendant,
even though the insurers had paid part of the plaintiff's loss and
under the substantive law were partial subrogees of the claim
against the defendant. He said, "Even though a partial subrogee
is a real party in interest, he is only a proper party, not a neces-
sary party, to a suit brought by the insured to recover the full
loss. 22 He distinguished the present case from the Aetna case by
saying that none of the three consolidated cases considered by the
court in Aetna were brought by the insured alone, thus the defend-
ant faced the possibility of a multiplicity of suits if joinder was not
compelled, ".. . but where the insured brings the suit alone, to
recover the whole loss, the controversy can be adjudicated com-
pletely and finally without the joinder of the insurer subrogees,
and the defendant will have only one suit to defend. -2 3 The
opinion went on to state, "In any event the recovery [by the in-
sured] may be impressed with a trust in favor of the party
claiming the right to subrogation."
Other decisions have stated that where the action is by the
insured for the whole loss, and the defendant does not object that
not all real parties in interest were named as plaintiffs, the re-
covery of the whole loss by the insured is impressed with a
trust for the insurer to the extent to which it was subrogated.
But it appears that the Braniff case is a minority of one in the
federal system in holding that the defendant cannot object to
the insured maintaining the action alone after being partially paid
by his insurer.
A motion for dismissal by the defendant was denied in St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Peoples National Gas Co.,24 where
'9 Supra, note 8, at 382.
20 See, Kansas Electric Power Co. v. Janis, supra, note 7; Gas Service
Co. v. Hunt, supra, note 7; National Garment Co. v. N.Y., C. & St.
L.R. Co., supra, note 17.
21 20 F.R.D. 141 (D. Minn. 1957).
22 Id. at 144.
23 Ibid.
24 Supra, note 18.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 39, 1960
the insurer as partial subrogee, brought an action against the
wrongdoer for the amount it had paid the insured. The defend-
ant's motion was based on the grounds that the insured was a
real party in interest, and as such must be named as a party
plaintiff on motion of the defendant, and in this instance the
naming of the insured as a party plaintiff would defeat jurisdic-
tion of the court since the insured lacked diversity with the de-
fendant. The court held that insured, as "owner" of part of the
claim against the defendant, was not an indispensible party, that
must be joined, even if joinder would defeat jurisdiction, be-
cause the insurer is definitely a real party in interest for the
amount it had paid, and had a right to assert this claim. It makes
no difference that the defendant might have to defend several
suits.29
In the case of Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Carolina Pea-
nut Co.,2 the insured sued the defendant for the whole loss. De-
fendant moved that plaintiff's insurers, except the Virginia Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., be made parties plaintiff because inclusion of
Virginia Fire would allegedly defeat diversity jurisdiction, as its
domicile was the same as that of the defendant. This motion was
granted. After judgment was entered for the whole loss, Vir-
ginia Fire & Marine sought to intervene and get judgment for
its pro rata share of the verdict against the defendant. The dis-
trict court denied the motion to intervene. In reversing this
ruling, the Fourth Circuit Court said, "Permitting intervention
after federal jurisdiction has attached by an insurer which is a
resident of the same state as the defendant, will not defeat the
jurisdiction of the court."2 7 The court went on to say;
The suit had been instituted by the Peanut Co. to recover the
damages which it had sustained as a result of the destruction of its
property by fire, and it is elementary that in such a case an in-
surance company which had paid a part of the loss is entitled to a
pro rata portion of any amount that may be recovered, and it is
entitled to join in the suit for the recovery of damages .... This
is a single wrong, the whole claim must be adjudicated in one
action 28
The Fifth Circuit in Ford v. United Gas Corp.29 held that it was not
error to grant the defendant's motion to make the plaintiff's in-
21 FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
26 186 F. 2d 816 (4th Cir. 1951).
27 Id. at 821.
28 Id. at 820.
29 254 F. 2d 817 (5th Cir. 1958).
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surers party-plaintiffs, even though the insurers had the same
citizenship as the defendant. Both the Virginia Electric & Power
Co. and Ford cases rely on the Supreme Court opinion in Wichita
R. & Light Co. v. P. U. Comm.,30 which held that jurisdiction is
not defeated by intervention of a party of like citizenship with
the plaintiff, by leave of the court, if the presence of the party
is not essential to a decision of the controversy between the
original parties. It is clear from the Aetna case that in cases of
partial subrogation neither the insured nor insurer is an indis-
pensible party to a suit brought by the other.31
If the insured and insurer sue as joint plaintiffs, it is sufficient
if their claims collectively equal the jurisdictional amount for
federal courts.32  In Farren et al v. Gas Service Co.,33 insured
joined with two insurers (A-paid insured $3,800, B-$2,500) in
a suit against the defendant for $23,000, defendant moved to dis-
miss on the grounds of no jurisdiction, because insurer B lacked
a large enough dollar claim to give the federal court jurisdiction.
In denying the motion the court said, "The several plaintiffs, so
far as damage to the realty is concerned, have united to enforce
a single title or right, in which they have a common and un-
divided interest, so it is enough if their interests collectively
equal the jurisdictional amount. '34
Since many people feel it is desirable to keep the insurer's
name out of the litigation because of possible prejudice, the
American Farmers Mutual Ins. Co., in the case of Petrikin v.
Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co.,35 used a reassignment agreement to re-
move the possibility of being made a party plaintiff after having
paid the insured and becoming partially subrogated to the claim
against the wrongdoer. After the insurer had made payment to
the insured for part of his loss, and by the terms of the policy
became subrogated to part of claim, the insurer reassigned any
claim it might have on account of the subrogation back to the
insured. Then the insured brought suit in his own name. In
denying the defendant's motion to have the insurer made a party
30 260 U.S. 48, 54 (1922).
31 Supra, note 8, at 382.
32 § 1332 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (Supp. 1959), presently
requires the amount in controversy to exceed $10,000 in diversity
cases.
33 122 F. Supp. 636 (D. Kan. 1957).
34 Id. at 537.
35 15 F.R.D. 346 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
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the court said, ". . . after the execution of said written assignment
plaintiff became the only real party in interest in the instant ac-
tion, and the . . . [insurer] . . . is established as not now being
such a party in interest to the claim here asserted against de-
fendant."3 6
As was said in the introduction, many state courts allow the
insured to sue alone in cases of partial payment and subrogation.
As these cases show, the federal courts follow the rule closer,
and say that after partial payment and subrogation the insurer
is a real party in interest and should prosecute the action in its
name jointly with the insured. But even the federal courts do
not look to the rule as a strict mandate, that is, they allow the
insured to sue for the whole unless the defendant objects and
then the insurer must be made a party. The rule makes no provi-
sion for such waiver, but this is the type of rule that can be waived,
since it is for the benefit of the defendant.
In allowing the insured to sue for the whole loss, in the
absence of an objection from the defendant, the federal courts
appear to do so on the same theory some of the state courts use;
the insured is suing as a trustee for the benefit of the insurer-
subrogee.
The interpretation of the rule by the federal courts gives
rise to the problem of splitting the cause of action. The prob-
lem of forcing the insured and insurer to sue jointly upon motion
of the defendant is accentuated by the diversity problem. Sup-
posedly if the insured prosecutes the action using diversity juris-
diction, and the defendant moves to make the insurer-subrogee a
party plaintiff, the court loses jurisdiction of the insurer lacks
diversity with the defendant, and thus the insured's action is
thrown out also. This problem has been taken care of to some
degree by treating the insurer as an intervenor, and as not being
an indispensible party.37 A proper application of the joinder of
parties rules and res judicata could lead to the same result with-
out the real party in interest rule.
The only problem then remaining is the idea that a jury
might be prejudiced against the insurance company. This prob-
lem is not met by the courts, and correctly so. The problem is
not to change the application of the law, but to defeat the preju-
dice, if one does exist. There are at least two possible ways to
36 Id. at 348.
37 See text at note 26, supra.
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defeat this prejudice. One is a procedural method to be used
to keep the jury from knowing an insurance company is involved
in the litigation, the other is through education of public in the
ideals of justice so they are not prejudiced when they sit as jurors.
IV. PAYMENT IN THE FORM OF A LOAN
Example C
P's $20,000 store building was totally destroyed by fire,
allegedly caused by the negligence of the D Power Co. in the
operation and maintenance of its electric power lines into the
building. P's fire insurer, the XYZ Ins. Co. "paid" P $20,000,
which P acknowledged and received, "... as a loan without
interest, repayable only in the event and to the extent of
any net recovery the undersigned may make from any person,
persons, corporation or corporations, or other parties, causing
or liable for the loss or damage to the property described
below, or from any insurance effected on such property, and
as security for such repayment the undersigned hereby
pledges to the said Company, all his, its, or their claim or
claims against said person, persons, corporation or corpora-
tions, or other parties, or from any insurance carrier or car-
riers, and any recovery thereon, and hereby delivers to said
Company all documents necessary to show his, its, or their
interest in said property."
The question arises whether the insurer after reimbursing the
insured for his loss in the form of a loan agreement or receipt,
becomes a real party in interest, which in the case of full reim-
bursement the insurer must sue in its own name, or if the in-
surer had reimbursed P for only part of the loss, whether the
wrong doer can force the insurer to be made a party. The cases
do not distinguish between cases of partial or complete reim-
bursement in the form of a loan agreement.
There seems to be no disagreement that a loan receipt is a
mere fiction, but when courts look to the purpose of the fiction,
i.e., to defeat prejudice frequently applied against insurance com-
panies by juries, it is generally agree that the fact that the loan
is a fiction is not alone sufficient to declare it a nullity, and its
use will be allowed because of the purpose it serves. Courts
generally will not say an agreement which is intended to avoid
the operation of undue prejudice is against public policy. 38
38 See Generally, Luckenbach v. McCaban Sugar Co., 248 U.S. 139
(1918); Augusta Broadcasting Co. v. U.S., 170 F. 2d 199 (5th Cir.
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Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the United States Supreme Court had approved the use of a loan
agreement by an insurer in the case of Luckenbach v. McCahan
Sugar Co.3 19 The court held that such an agreement was a valid
business agreement, and should have no effect on the right of the
recipient of the loan to bring an action against the wrongdoer.
In the case of First Nat. Bank of Ottawa v. Lloyd's of London,40
the plaintiff bank had been reimbursed in the form of a loan from
its excess insurer for the whole loss it had suffered from a robbery.
In the suit against the primary insurer for the amount of the loss,
the defendant's motion to make the excess insurer a party was
denied. The court held that since the reimbursement was in the
form of a loan, and such a loan was provided for in the policy, the
loan was valid and the insured remained the real party in interest.
The Federal District Court of Missouri in Rosenfeld v. Continental
Building Operation Co.,41 placed emphasis on the insurance policy
providing for such a loan. In interpreting a loan agreement made
in New York, it was held that under New York law if the policy
does not provide for "payment" in the form of a loan, the loan
is to be treated as payment,42 with the substantive right being
subrogated to the insurer. The Rosenfeld case and Miller v. Pine
Bluff Hotel Co. 43 are the only federal decisions which place em-
phasis on the point that the policy must provide for a loan agree-
ment before it is valid.4 4 Other cases recognize the act of the
insurer in extending a loan, rather than making payment for the
loss, as a practice approved by the courts, and treat it as a loan.
1948); Perrera v. Smolouitz, 11 F.R.D. 377 (E.D.N.Y. 1951); Merri-
man v. Cities Service Gas Co. et al, 11 F.R.D. 165 (S.D. Mo. 1951);
Capo v. C-O Two Fire Equipment Co., 93 F.Supp. 4 (D.N.J. 1950);
Ratcliff v. Worthington, 298 S. W. 2d 18 (Ky. 1951).
39 Supra, note 38.
40 116 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1940).
41 135 F.Supp. 465 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
42 Sosnow, KTanz & Simcoe v. Storatii Corp., 269 App. Div. 122, 54 N.Y.
S.2d 780, 295 N.Y. 675, N.E.2d 326 (1946); Maurice Slater Trucking
Co., Inc. v. Maus, 273 App. Div. 139, 77 N.Y.S. 2d 343 (1948); Charles
Miller Coat Co. v.Myron Herbert, Inc., 86 N.Y.S. 2d 736, 89 N.Y.S. 2d
703, 300 N.Y. 477, 88 N. E. 2d 659 (1949).
43 170 F.Supp. 552 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
44 The opinion in First National Bank of Ottawa v. Lloyd's of Landon,
supra, note 40, states that payment in the form of a loan was provided
for in the policy, but does not state that this is a controlling factor.
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The court in Capo v. C-O Two Fire Equipment Co.,45 recog-
nized a loan receipt as being valid, and said,
The 'real party in interest' within the meaning of the rule [17a]
is that party who, under the substantive law, has a legal right
to enforce the claim. It is our opinion that the plaintiff [insured]
in the instant case meets the test. The present plaintiffs retained
the legal right to enforce their claims agains the defendant,...
the insurer acquired nothing more than a beneficial interest in
the recovery, if any. Any other construction would defeat the
clear intention of the parties, the plaintiffs and the insurers, as
expressed in the loan receipt.
Other courts have looked upon the loan agreement as giving
the insurer a beneficial interest in the claim against the wrong-
doer. In Merriman v. Cities Service Gas -Co. et al,46 the court
held that after the execution of the loan agreement, the insured
became a trustee, and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 17 (a)
could sue in his own name without joining the beneficiary, in this
instance, the insurer. Judge Delehant of the District of Nebraska
applied the same theory in Williams v. Union Pac. R. Co.
47
Although a loan agreement was approved in Perrera v. Smolo-
wity,48 the court added a caveat,
However, while the parties have been correctly named in
the legal sense [insurer after making loans to insured, conducted
the litigation, but in the name of the insured], that which their
respective insurers have contrived may be consulted in the effort
to ascertain what each party may in truth be deemed to have
done or omitted, insofar as their past conduct may affect their
present legal rights . . . To reason otherwise . . ' would ascribe
too much substance to the distinction in form between the pay-
ment of the policy loss, and the delivery of a loan receipt in lieu
thereof.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has dealt with the use of loan
receipts in two different situations. In Shiman Bros. & Co. v.
Nebraska National Hotel Co.,49 the insurer had made a loan to
the plaintiff-insured, but not for the full amount of the loss. The
court relied on the Luckenbach case in recognizing the use of
loan receipts. From the tenor of the opinion it could be said that
the plaintiff-insured would have been the only real party in
interest whether the loan agreement was treated as a loan or
45 Supra, note 38, at 6.
46 Supra, note 38.
47 194 F. Supp 174 (D. Neb. 1950).
48 Supra, note 38, at 379.
49 143 Neb. 404, 9 N. W. 2d 807 (1943).
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payment, since the court stated the rule that if the insurance
paid by an insurer covers only a portion of the loss, the right of
action against the wrongdoer who caused the loss remains in the
insured for the entire loss, and the action must be brought by him
in his own name. In a later opinion5" the court cited the Shiman
case and stated that where the insurer used a loan agreement to
reimburse the insured for the whole loss, the loan agreement will
be treated as a loan, and the action can be prosecuted by the in-
sured in his own name.
The use of a loan agreement -seems to do away with many
problems. There is no longer a question of splitting the cause
of action, or the application of prejudice against the insurer. This
result is achieved through the use of a fiction, the loan agreement.
There are other fictions in the law; should one more be created
to escape the problems created by the real party in interest rule
or should the rule be changed?
V. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PAYMENTS
Example D
P, an employee of the S Co. of Nebraska, went to Kansas
to install a machine made by his employer in the M & N Co.'s
plant. While so doing, and in the course of his employment,
he was severely injured, allegedly due to the negligence of
the M & N Co. P received workmen's compensation insurance
benefits under the provisions of the Nebraska statutes from
his employer's insurer, the XYZ Ins. Co. P now brings a
tort action against the M & N Co. in Federal District Co.
Of course the question is, has the insurer been subrogated to
any of P's substantive rights against the wrongdoer and if so, is
the insurer a real party in interest. The decisions in cases with
facts similar to the example are varied and somewhat conflicting.
Each decision places particular and different emphasis on varying
provisions of the statutes under which the compensation was paid.
In Nebraska there is no question that the employer or his
insurer must be parties to an action against a third party wrong-
doer. The statute specifically states that the employer shall be
subrogated to the rights of the employee against a third person,
and the recovery by the employer is not limited to the amount
of compensation paid, and that suit can be for any amount the
50 Bozell & Jacobs, Inc. v. Blackstone Terminal Garage, Inc., 162 Neb.
47, 75 N. W. 2d 366 (1956).
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employee is entitled to recover. There is no requirement that
the employee be made a party to the action. The statute has a
proviso that allows the employee to sue, on the condition that
the employer is made a party to the action or purposes of re-
imbursement.51 In other jurisdictions the statutes are not as
specific, thus the application of the real party in interest rule
becomes a problem when suit is prosecuted in a federal court.
The Michigan statute5 2 allows the employee to sue, if he does
not bring suit within one year, the employer or the insurer can
prosecute the action. In Shumate v. Wahlers53 the employee
brought suit against the third party wrongdoer three years after
the injury occurred. The defendant's motion to make the insurer
a party was denied. The court said that the statutes provided
that any recovery first go to reimburse the insurer who had paid
benefits, and this took care of the interest of the insurer. The
opinion went on to state that Rule 17 (a) allows suit to be pros-
euted in the name of the party authorized by statute, and
interpreted the Michigan statute as allowing the employee to
sue for the insurer's interest also. In a subsequent case, Carlson
v. Consumers Power Co.5 4 the Federal District Court of the West-
ern District of Michigan granted the motion of the defendant re-
quiring the workmen's compensation insurer, who had paid bene-
fits under the Michigan statute, to be made a party plaintiff. The
court in this case said that since pursuant to the statute any re-
covery first goes to reimburse the insurer, the insurer must be
subrogated and thereby he becomes a real party in interest and
may be made a party on motion of the plaintiff. The court men-
tioned the Shumate opinion, and said the provision of Rule 17
(a) relied on in that opinion does not in any way affect the rights
granted by Rules 19 & 21 to have a real party in interest made
a party. The reasoning and holding of the Carlson case was re-
iterated in Smallwood v. Days Transfer, Inc.;5
The Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act 6 allows either
the employee or the employer-insurer to sue. The court in Jenkins
51 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-118 (Reissue 1952).
52 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 17.189 (1948), as amended, MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 413.15 (Supp. 1954).
53 19 F.R.D. 173 (E.D. Mich. 1956).
54 164 F. Supp. 692 (W.D. Mich. 1957).
55 165 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. Mich. 1958).
56 MO. REV. STAT. §§ 287.010-780 (1949).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 39, 1960
v. Westinghouse Electric Co.57 said, ". . . both the employee and
the employer-insurer are vested with title to, and ownership of,
the cause of action for the employee's bodily injuries against the
negligent third party, 'as trustee of an express trust,' and either
may sue as such trustee." In applying Rule 17 (a), the opinion
stated, ". .. this procedural rule expressly provides that when,
by the substantive local law of the state, the plaintiff is, and sues
as, a trustee of an express trust need not, in suing in the federal
court, join with him the beneficiaries of the trust."58 The holding
concluded by denying the defendant's motion to make the insurer
a party plaintiff to the action brought by the injured employee.
The language of the opinion indicates that the employer-insurer
could have prosecuted the action, even for more than the amount
of compensation paid, and the defendant could not force the
bringing in of the employee.
In Pyle v. Kansas Gas & Electric Co.59 an employer, who had
received compensation under the Kansas statute,60 brought suit
against the defendant for injuries suffered allegedly due to the
negligence of the defendant. In denying the defendant's motion
to make the compensation insurer of the plaintiff's employer a
party plaintiff, the court held that the statute gives the employee
the right to sue and gives the insurer a lien on any recovery for
the amount of compensation paid, thus the plaintiff-employee is
a party authorized by statute to sue and falls within the proviso
of Rule 17 (a) allowing him to sue in his own name. The Federal
District Court of Illinois in King v. Cairo Ellis Home Ass'n.,61
construed the Illinois workmen's compensation statute62 in a like
manner in regards to the real party in interest question, stating
that when the employee brought suit the employer-insurer had
a lien on any recovery for the amount of compensation paid.
In Koepp v. Northwest Freight Lines,6 3 plaintiff-employee
was injured in Minnesota, allegedly due to the negligence of the
defendant. Plaintiff was a resident of Wisconsin and had received
compensation benefits from his employer's insurer under the Wis-
57 18 F.R.D. 267, 270 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
58 Id. at 270.
59 23 F.R.D. 148 (D. Kan. 1959).
00 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (Supp. 1959).
61 145 F. Supp. 681 (E.D. I1. 1956).
62 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(b) (1953).
63 10 F.RD. 524 (D. Minn. 1950).
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consin statute. 64  The suit was prosecuted in the federal court,
District of Minnesota. The court held that the Wisconsin statute
allowed either the employee or the employer-insurer, or both, to
sue the wrongdoer, thus both had a substantive right against the
wrongdoer, were real parties in interest, and on timely motion
of the defendant, must be made parties to the action. The Federal
District Court of Ohio, in Carlson v. Glenn L. Martin Co.,65 con-
strued the Wisconsin statute6 the same way, and granted the
defendant's motion to make the employer's insurer a party to the
action. The federal court in State of Maryland to Nee of Carson
v. Acme Poultry Corp.,6 7 reached the same conclusion in consider-
ing the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Statute. 68
The federal court, District of Indiana, in construing the In-
diana Statute,69 held that the employer-insurer is not subrogated
to any substantive right of the employee against the liable third
party, nor can he prosecute suit, until one of two events has oc-
curred, (a) suit brought by the employee is dismissed, or (b) two
years has elapsed since the suffering of the injury, and until one
of these has happened the employer-insurer is not a real party in
interest and cannot be compelled to join the action.7 0
Although the state workmen's compensation statutes construed
by the federal courts in these cases are not too dissimilar, the
bases of the holdings are different. Some of the courts held that,
under the statute, no substantive right had been subrogated to
the employer or his insurer, and thus under the basic definition
of the real party in interest rule, the employee is the only party
to maintain the actions. In some of the cases the different per-
missive exceptions to the real party in interest rule were applied
to allow the injured employee to sue alone, even though the em-
ployer or his insurer had been subrogated to part of substantive
right. Perhaps this was done to remove the problems of prejudice,
jurisdiction, and splitting the cause of action that arise when there
are two real parties in interest, and one of them is an insurance
company. Yet other federal courts said there was subrogation,
64 WIS. STAT. § 102.01 (1940).
65 103 F. Supp. 153 (N.D. Ohio. 1952).
66 Supra, note 64.
67 9 F.R.D. 687 (D. Del. 1949).
68 PA. STAT. tit. 77, §§ 1-1065 (1936).
69 IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-1201-2507 (1954).
70 Strate v. Niagara Machine & Tool Co., 160 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Ind.
1958).
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the insurer was a real party in interest, and must, on objection
of the defendant be made a party plaintiff. Such a determination
leaves the court with the same problems as were discussed above
in cases of partial subrogation in collision and fire losses.
The insurance companies cannot use loan agreements in pay-
ing workmen's compensation cases, because the liability is abso-
lute by statute, thus one of the methods used to defeat the possi-
bility of being named a party plaintiff is removed.
Perhaps another reason for the difference in the bases of the
holdings in the workmen's compensation cases is that the federal
court must determine if, under the state substantive law, here the
workmen's compensation statute, any rights are subrogated to the
insurer who has paid benefits to the injured employee. In so
doing, the federal judge will look to what the state's own courts
have said in this area. But due to the lack of a similar application
of the real party in interest rule in many states, the problem has
never been decided by the state court, thus the federal court
must decide what the state court's decision would be if it were
faced with the problem which as usual places the federal court in
a somewhat uncomfortable guessing position.
After determining whether or not there is subrogation under
the state substantive law, the federal court must then apply rule
17 (a). Since many states allow the employee to sue without
joining the insurer, the federal court perhaps wants to hedge on,
or protect its determination of the substantive law, and thus fits
the employee into one of the permissive exceptions of Rule 17 (a),
allowing him to sue in his own name, as a trustee, or as a party
authorized by statute. Such a determination, regardless of the
federal court's decision on the substantive law question has as
its end result, the case being litigated in the names of the same
parties as it would have been in the state court, thus leaving little
room for criticism.
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the decisions discussed above, it is clear that in
many instances insurance companies will of necessity, after mak-
ing payment under their policies, be plaintiffs to recover damages
from wrongdoers to property of their insureds, and often the
claim will be required to be jointly prosecuted in the names of
the insured and insurer. This is true unless the method of re-
imbursement used is such that it does not cause subrogation of
any substantive rights to the insurer. If prejudices do exist against
insurance companies, and are or would be frequently applied by
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the jury, this does not represent a fair and impartial court for
adjudication of the claim.
Since the real party in interest rule already has several per-
missive exceptions, another could be added to handle the prob-
lems of prejudices, diversity jurisdiction and splitting the cause
of action in cases of partial subrogation to an insurer. This is
apparently a workable method, because the courts of several states
have in effect made such an exception and allow the insured to
sue alone for the whole loss.
As was shown in the discussion of the cases in which loan
agreements were used, the loan, which is a fiction, can be used
as a method of reimbursement which will not create these prob-
lems. With the use of a loan there is no subrogation of substantive
rights and the insured is the only real party in interest. The
insurance companies themselves can use this method of reim-
bursement, and thereby prevent any problems, even in light of
the present law.
In most cases no procedural statute or rule states who must
be the defendant of an action; the substantive law sufficiently
handles this. It would appear that the proper application of res
judicata and the joinder of parties rules, to protect against the
splitting of the cause of action, along with the substantive law,
would be sufficient to dictate who can be a plaintiff, thus there
is no need for a real party in interest rule such as Rule 17 (a).
Possibly the permissive exceptions section of the rule should be
retained because it makes some necessary exceptions to the sub-
stantive law.
In most of the insurance cases, even though the action is
prosecuted in the name of the insured, the insurance company
employs the counsel and directs the litigation, and the insured
does not actively participate. As was discussed in the introduc-
tion, res judicata could be invoked against the insurer in this sit-
uation if it does not include in the same action the amount of the
claim to which it was subrogated. Since the insurer is directing
the litigation there is no question that it has notice that the suit
is being prosecuted. If the claim against the wrongdoer is to be
treated as a single cause of action the doctrine of res judicata
could be used to bar a subsequent suit by the insured. This would
then force the insurer to join with the insured or be barred from
prosecuting the action. This is a more sensible rule to be ap-
plied to prevent the splitting of a cause of action then using the
real party in interest rule. Thus one of the reasons expounded
in favor of the rule has little merit. But, no matter which rule
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is used to force the two to sue together, the problems of prejudice
and diversity jurisdiction in federal courts still remain.
The problem of prejudice could be handled by not telling the
jury that an insurance company is the owner of part of the claim
being prosecuted. The application of prejudice can be overem-
phasized. Some states have compulsory insurance laws, and in
metropolitan areas the jurors know that almost every driver has
insurance. If the jury knows or believes that the defendant is
protected by insurance, it should not create unfair prejudice to
tell the jury that an insurer is one of the claimants in the action.
In fact this type of disclosure might lead to a more impartial
verdict.
It is interesting t6 note that the Nebraska real party in inter-
est statutes, and those of many other states that have not adopted
the federal rule, differ only slightly from Rule 17 (a). Thus
without much difficulty, the Nebraska courts could require the
insurer to be a party plaintiff in the same instances as does the
federal rule.
